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T

he labor force participation rate
(LFPR) is a key social indicator. Along
with the unemployment rate, the LFPR is
of paramount concern to states because
work and earnings from employment are
central determinants of living standards.
The LFPR varies dramatically
among the states. In 2011, the LFPR
was less than 60 percent in three states
(Mississippi, Alabama, and West

Of five key differences between
Mississippi and the Blueprint
states, the most dramatic
is that nearly 60 percent of
Mississippi’s residents lived
in nonmetropolitan areas in
2009, compared with 19
percent in the Blueprint states.
Virginia) and greater than 72 percent
in two (North Dakota and Minnesota).
Because the state of Mississippi has
historically had one of the lowest LFPRs
in the United States, in August 2011,
the Mississippi Governor’s Office
commissioned the Upjohn Institute
to study the reasons for Mississippi’s
relatively low LFPR. This article
summarizes the main findings of the
Institute’s research. (For a complete
description of the work with additional

references, see Lachowska and Woodbury
[2012a,b.])
The LFPR gap between Mississippi
and other states is longstanding. Figure
1 shows time series of the LFPRs of
Mississippi and a group of 12 states—
referred to as the Blueprint states—
chosen by the state of Mississippi to craft
its “Blueprint Mississippi,” an economic
development effort sponsored by the
Mississippi Economic Council of the
Mississippi Chamber of Commerce. The
Blueprint states include the four states
contiguous with Mississippi (Louisiana,
Arkansas, Tennessee, and Alabama), plus
Texas, Oklahoma, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Kentucky, Georgia, and Florida.
Figure 1 shows that LFPRs in
Mississippi and the Blueprint states
trended upward from the mid 1970s
until the mid 1990s, following a broad
national trend (Aaronson, Davis, and Hu
2012). Since the mid 1990s the LFPRs
in Mississippi and the Blueprint states
have all fallen—a trend that started even
before the recession of 2001. The figure
also shows that, throughout this time
period, Mississippi’s LFPR has been 3–4
percentage points below the LFPR of the
Blueprint states, and that Mississippi’s
LFPR dropped by nearly 2 percentage
points following Hurricane Katrina in
August 2005, temporarily creating an
even larger than usual gap between
Mississippi and the Blueprint states.
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Figure 1 Labor Force Participation Rates in Mississippi and the Blueprint States,
1976–2010
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nearly 60 percent of Mississippi’s
residents lived in nonmetropolitan areas
in 2009, compared with 19 percent in
the Blueprint states (see Figure 3). This
difference may be important because
residents of nonmetropolitan areas
have significantly lower LFPRs than
do residents of metropolitan areas—
about 65 percent in metropolitan areas
versus 57 percent in nonmetropolitan
areas. Accordingly, Mississippi’s mix
of metropolitan and nonmetropolitan
residents—which is skewed toward
nonmetropolitan residents—is one likely
explanation of the LFPR gap between
Mississippi and the Blueprint states.

56

2) Race

68

66

Percent

64

62

60

54

Blueprint states

Mississippi

NOTE: Light blue bars indicate recessions as defined by the National Bureau of Economic
Research. The pink bar indicates 2005, the year of Hurricane Katrina.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment
Statistics.

Labor Force Participation Rates of
Population Subgroups
We follow a long tradition in the
analysis of labor force participation and
examine five subgroups of the civilian
noninstitutional population (see Figure 2):
1) Men, ages 25–54, sometimes
called “prime-age males,” who have
traditionally been the most active
labor force participants, with LFPRs
approaching 90 percent in some years.
2) Married women, ages 25–54, who
showed dramatic growth in labor force
participation in the years following
World War II, as they substituted work
in the labor market for work at home,
and whose LFPRs are now within 10–15
percentage points of prime-age males.
3) Single women (never married,
divorced, and widowed), ages 25–54,
who have long had LFPRs approaching
those of prime-age men.
4) Older persons, ages 55 and older,
who have the lowest LFPRs of the
five groups because they are prone to
retirement.
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5) Younger persons, ages 16–24, who
have lower LFPRs than people ages 25–
54 partly because they are still in school
(or other training), and partly because
they have less human capital and earnings
capacity than older people and have
limited opportunities in the labor market.
Figure 2 shows that, except in the
case of married women, the LFPRs of
the Mississippi population are lower than
those in the Blueprint states.
Key Differences between Mississippi
and the Blueprint States
The LFPR differences between
residents of Mississippi and the Blueprint
states may be attributable to a range
of factors, some measurable, others
difficult to quantify. We focus on five key
differences between Mississippi and the
Blueprint states:
1) Nonmetropolitan residence
Of the five potentially relevant
differences, the most dramatic is that

The Mississippi population has a
significantly higher percentage of black
residents (36 percent) than the Blueprint
states (18.5 percent). This difference
matters because most groups of the
black population have lower LFPRs than
their white counterparts. For example,
the LFPR of black men 25–54 in the
Blueprint states is nearly 77 percent,
compared with nearly 89 percent for
white men. (The LFPR gap between
black and white men in Mississippi is
even larger.) Only for married women
25–54 is the LFPR of blacks greater than
that of whites.
3) Incidence of health problems
A third set of differences between
Mississippi and the Blueprint states
is that Mississippi residents report a
higher incidence of health problems.
The American Community Survey
asks questions about five types of
health issues: 1) cognitive difficulties,
2) ambulatory difficulty, 3) difficulty
taking care of oneself, 4) difficulty living
independently, and 5) vision or hearing
difficulties. In most cases, Mississippi
residents are more likely to report having
one or more of these health difficulties.
Only in the case of younger persons are
Mississippi residents and residents of
the comparison states (approximately)
equally likely to report having each of
these health difficulties.
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Mississippi and the Blueprint states
differ in the percentage of individuals
who receive government transfers
such as Social Security, Supplemental
Security Income (SSI), and Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance (or Food Stamps).
• Among men 25–54, women 25–54
(both married and single), and
younger persons, the incidence of
income from Social Security is higher
in Mississippi than in the Blueprint
states, usually by about 60 percent.
• Similarly, the incidence of SSI
receipt is higher in Mississippi than
in the Blueprint states, usually by 50
percent or more.
• The incidence of Food Stamp receipt
is higher in Mississippi than in the
Blueprint states among all groups,
but most notably among single
women 25–54 and younger persons,
for whom Food Stamp receipt is 40
percent higher in Mississippi.
Higher incidence of government transfers
is usually related to lower LFPRs, either
because recipients have fewer marketable
skills or because the availability of
nonwage income reduces the need to
participate in the labor force.

Figure 2 Labor Force Participation Rates of Population Subgroups in Mississippi
and the Blueprint States, 2009
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the 2009 American Community Survey, Integrated Public
Use Microdata Series (ACS-IPUMS).

Figure 3 Differences between Mississippi and the Blueprint States in the
Percentage of Residents Living Outside of Metropolitan Areas, 2009

5) Educational attainment
Compared with the Blueprint states,
a higher percentage of Mississippi
residents had not completed high
school, and a lower percentage were
college graduates. These differences are
potentially important because LFPRs
tend to be higher for individuals with
higher educational attainment: The LFPR
of high school dropouts in Mississippi
was only 35 percent in 2009, whereas
the LFPR of high school graduates was
nearly 60 percent, and the LFPR of those
with some postsecondary education was
70 percent or more.
Accounting for LFPR Gaps between
Mississippi and Other States
To what extent do the LFPR gaps
between Mississippi and the Blueprint
states reflect the interstate differences
just discussed? We answer this question
using the well-known Blinder-Oaxaca
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the 2009 ACS-IPUMS.

technique, which decomposes the total
LFPR gap between Mississippi and
the Blueprint states into components
attributable to (or “explained by”) various
factors.
Table 1 summarizes the findings.
The Total LFPR Gap column shows the
LFPR gap (in percentage points) between
Mississippi and the Blueprint states in

2009. For example, for men 25–54, the
LFPR in Mississippi was 5.3 percentage
points less than in the Blueprint states.
Of this 5.3 point gap, 2.1 points can
be attributed to the fact that a higher
percentage of men 25–54 in Mississippi
lived in nonmetropolitan areas, another
1.2 points occurred because a higher
percentage of Mississippi men are black,
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Table 1 Percentage Point LFPR Gaps Explained by Five Key Differences between
Mississippi and the Blueprint States, by Population Subgroup
Percentage points attributable to differences in:
NonmetGovernment
Total LFPR ropolitan Percentage Health
transfer Educational
Demographic group
gap
residence
black
problems
receipt
attainment
Men 25–54
–5.3
–2.1
–1.2
–1.0
–0.9
—
Married women 25–54
+1.1
—
+1.2a
–0.7
—
+0.3
Single women 25–54
–5.5
–1.7
—
–0.8
–1.6
–0.9
Older persons
–3.1
–1.2
—
–1.1
—
–0.7
Younger persons
–4.1
–0.8
–1.2
—
—
–0.4
a

Mississippi’s higher percentage of blacks among married women increases the LFPR of
Mississippi’s married women because the LFPR of black married women exceeds that of white
married women.
NOTE: Compared with the Blueprint states, a higher percentage of Mississippi residents live in a
nonmetropolitan area, are black, report health problems, and receive government transfers. The
educational attainment of Mississippi residents is on average lower than in the Blueprint states.
SOURCE: Lachowska and Woodbury (2012a,b).

another 1.0 point is due to a higher
incidence of health problems among
Mississippi men, and 0.9 point is related
to a higher incidence of government
transfers.
Table 1 suggests that the main reasons
for Mississippi’s LFPR gap differ among
the five population groups:
1) The relatively high concentration of
Mississippi residents in nonmetropolitan
areas is the most consistent reason for
Mississippi’s lower LFPR.
2) Mississippi’s relatively high
percentage of black residents has a
mixed impact on its LFPR. For men and
younger persons, it tends to reduce the
LFPR. For married women, it raises the
LFPR because the LFPR of black married
women exceeds that of white married
women.
3) Higher incidence of health
problems helps explain the lower LFPR
of Mississippi’s men, women (both single
and married), and older persons.
4) Higher incidence of government
transfer receipt helps explain the lower
LFPR of Mississippi’s men and single
women.
5) Lower educational attainment
reduces the LFPR of Mississippi’s single
women, older persons, and younger
persons.
For all but younger persons, the five
key measurable differences between
Mississippi and the Blueprint states
account for (or “explain”) most of
the gap between Mississippi and
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the Blueprint states. However, for
younger persons more than half of
the gap must be attributed to cultural,
historical, and institutional factors that
are difficult to measure and quantify.
The legacy of racial discrimination, the
connection of Mississippi residents to
rural communities, and an agricultural
sector that is in long-term decline are all
possible contributors.
Policy Implications
The findings may have three
implications for policy. First, the
connection between low LFPRs and
nonmetropolitan residence provides
a rationale for targeting regional
economic development toward
nonmetropolitan areas of Mississippi
(see also Range [2011]). Such efforts
at regional development could be
augmented with efforts to connect
workers in nonmetropolitan areas with
job opportunities in urban areas that are
relatively nearby, for example, through
inexpensive and accessible transportation.
Second, the connection between
educational attainment and labor force
participation provides a rationale for
improving the quality of education
generally and, more specifically, for
creating opportunities for vocational and
technical training in occupation-specific
skills that employers indicate they
demand.

Third, for young persons culture and
institutions play a large role in explaining
the LFPR gap between Mississippi
and other states. This suggests that
special efforts may be needed to create
employment opportunities for high school
students in Mississippi, so that young
people see the relevance of schooling
to job opportunities and to gaining a
foothold in the labor market. Policies
that could be helpful include cooperative
programs connecting school to work, and
direct employer subsidies to encourage
the hiring of young people.
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Nancy Mohan and Ting Zhang

What Determines Public
Pension Investment
Risk-Taking Policy?
See p. 7 for new and recent books on pension
policy published by the Upjohn Institute.

S

tate public pension plans, mostly
defined benefit plans, cover pension
benefits for 12.8 million active public
employees and 5.9 million retirees and
other annuitants.1 However, by the
end of 2009, public pension plans had
accumulated a total funding deficit of
$697 billion (measured by the difference
between actuarial pension assets and
liabilities). On average, public pension
funds cover 75 percent of their liabilities,
but individual state results vary greatly.
The 2008 stock market crash strongly
affected pension asset value in that equity
allocation on average accounted for 56
percent of invested assets. The average
2009 pension asset beta of 0.63 suggests
that if the market fell 35 percent (the drop
experienced during the 2008 financial
crisis), public plans would lose 22
percent of their total fund value.2
Therefore, an important yet largely
overlooked issue related to pension
underfunding is the investment risk
level assumed by public pension plans.
As shown in Figure 1, the state pension
funds equity allocation varied greatly at
the end of 2009, from 11 percent (South
Carolina) to 69 percent (Nebraska and
Mississippi). The current funding gap
prompts the question of whether the
pension fund managers will adopt riskier
investment positions in hopes of raising
returns and lowering the shortfall.3
This article summarizes our research
that is reported in our Upjohn Institute
working paper (Mohan and Zhang 2012).
In it, we examine the determinants
of pension risk-taking policy during
the period 2001–2009 after taking
into consideration state government
incentives, political pressure, fiscal

constraints, public union presence, and
workforce features.
Factors Affecting Pension Funds
Risk-Taking Policy
We measure pension risk as either
the percentage of total plan assets
invested in the equity market or pension
asset beta. The more risk assumed
by the fund manager (higher equity
allocation or higher asset beta), the
more sensitive the fund is to market
volatility. So, what are the factors that
could affect investment risk? One
incentive may be risk management.
When a pension fund is underfunded
the state is obligated to increase
contributions. Unexpected, required
funding for pension contributions may
reduce the ability to invest in schools
or police, for example, because in the
short run, the state/municipal budget
is fixed. The implications are that,
from a risk management perspective,
states would prefer to have predictable
pension contributions. Accordingly,
asset allocation decisions would be a
function of funding status—safe, wellfunded plans could invest in more risky
securities, while underfunded plans invest
in less risky assets. Alternatively, there
is a risk transfer element to consider:
taxpayers are ultimately responsible for
underfunded public pension plans, and
governments may raise taxes to fund
pension plans (Gold 2003).
Other factors may also affect risktaking investment policy. Public pension
plans have a unique set of issues to
consider: politics, fiscal constraints, and
public pension accounting. Political
influence could pressure the fund
to buy bonds issued by the state or
local government or to direct funds to
economically targeted investments.

And if these investments provide
inefficient returns, then remaining
assets may be invested in riskier
securities. Furthermore, if states face
fiscal limitations that restrict borrowing,
pension fund debt may act as a
substitute (Novy-Marx and Rauh 2009).
Fiscal constraints also cause states to
manipulate actuarial assumptions to
lower required contributions (Eaton and
Nofsinger 2004). Public pension plans
are regulated by the government standard
(GASB 25), which allows liabilities to
be discounted at the assumed plan rate
of return, which most commonly is 8
percent. Higher assumed returns reduce
the discounted liabilities, which in turn
reduces the required contributions.
Accordingly, we label these factors
political influence, fiscal constraint, and
accounting effect.
Finally, we consider union
membership, demographic makeup of employees, and follow-theleader investment behavior. If union
membership is associated with higher
pension obligations, investment policy
could become riskier in order to chase
higher returns. From a demographic
perspective, age and gender of plan
participants may affect the risktaking policy of the fund. In addition,
investment managers tend to mimic
each other. According to Park (2009),
managers of public pension funds tend to
follow peer group norms such that asset
allocation to all equity hovers around
64–75 percent. Alternatively, public
pension plan managers may follow the
best performers or plans considered to be
large and influential, such as CalPERS.
We name these factors union effect,
demographic effect, and herding effect.
Summary of Our Results
We find that accounting standards
strongly affect public fund investment
risk, as higher return assumptions (used
to discount pension liabilities) are
associated with higher equity allocations
and betas. In particular, a 100 basis point
increase in pension return assumption
is associated with a 1.72–4.51 percent
increase in equity allocation. The
corresponding increase in pension asset
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beta given a same magnitude increase
in the return assumption is 0.04–0.06,
suggesting that an important incentive
for the fund manager is justifying the
liabilities discount rate.
Our results also suggest that public
funds assume more risk if they are
underfunded or have lower investment
returns in the previous year, evidence
consistent with risk transfer or intent to
pass underfunded pension obligations to
future taxpayers. This risk-taking policy
is not necessarily in the plan participants’
best interest. Taxpayers might ultimately
be called upon to close the funding gap.
When states are constrained from
issuing additional debt, underfunding
pension funds may substitute for
borrowing. And because states can justify
a higher discount rate for liabilities
through the assumed rate of return,
states facing financial constraints may
subsequently invest in riskier assets,
resulting in higher pension plan betas
and/or larger equity allocations. We
find that pension funds in states facing
financial constraints are more likely to
take higher risk in their pension fund
investment.
Our results suggest a degree of
follow-the-leader in that plan managers
tend to follow the risk-investing policy
of large and high-profile plans (such as
CalPERS). Furthermore, we report a
mild public union effect; that is, in order
to provide larger retirement benefits
for unionized public employees, fund
managers pursue a riskier investment
allocation. Finally, limited evidence
suggests that economically targeted
investment policies are associated with
lower pension investment risk.
Overall, our findings suggest that the
risk levels of public pension funds are
determined by various factors: incentives
to justify the accounting discount rate
choice, shifting pension risk to future
tax payers, and substituting underfunded
pension liabilities for borrowing. A first
step towards addressing the problem
would be to appropriately discount future
liabilities.
Notes
1. These figures are from November, 2011.
The most current figures, as of February
2012, are 13.2 million active and 7.1 million
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Figure 1 State Pension Plans Equity Allocation as of Fiscal Year 2009
< 45%
= 45–55%
= > 55%

SOURCE: Center for Retirement Research at Boston College (2011).

retirees and other annuitants. Data available
from http://www.publicfundsurvey.org/
publicfundsurvey/scorecard.asp (accessed
March 6, 2012).
2. Beta measures the sensitivity of
financial asset returns to the overall stock
market change (i.e., using the S&P 500 index
as a proxy). Pension asset beta captures the
risk of a pension plan’s exposure to alternative
investments, including private equity, venture
capital, hedge funds, and other alternative
assets. It was first proposed by Jin, Merton,
and Bodie (2006).
3. Allocation to private equity funds
increased to 11 percent as of September 2011
(Corkery 2012).
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